What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. We argue for an approach focusing on reconstruction rather than interpretation of quantum mechanics. After discussing the concept of reconstruction, we analyze the problem of metatheoretic justification of the choice of axioms and then study several examples of reconstruction.
1 What is wrong with interpreting quantum mechanics?
Ever since the first days of quantum mechanics physicists as well as philosophers tried to interpret it, understanding this task as a problem of giving to the new, puzzling physical theory a clear meaning. Looking globally, this enterprize failed: still today we have no consensus on what the meaning of quantum theory is. Proposed answers are many but none of them has won overall recognition.
Perhaps the most remarkable manifestation of the failure to interpret quantum mechanics is the attitude taught to most young physicists in lecture rooms and research laboratories in the last half century, "Write down equations and calculate! No need to ask questions!"
Why did attempts at univocal interpretation fail? Many answers are possible, and among them we favor two, both showing that there is an intrinsic deficiency in the idea of interpreting philosophically a physical theory.
The first answer is that to a physical theory one would naturally like to give a physical meaning in the Greek sense of ϕύσις, i.e. we -as part of the physicists'
audience -expect to be told a story about the immanent, fundamental nature. This is because we casually tend to apply physical theory to the phenomenal world to learn something about the latter, and not the world to physical theory in order to invent a meaning of the theory. Physical theory is above all a tool for predicting the yet unobserved phenomena; so employing the existing knowledge and experience of the world to interpreting physics runs counter to its basic function as a scientific theory. However, notwithstanding such an against-the-grain direction in which a philosophical interpretation operates, the former does not necessarily lead to a formal contradiction that would invalidate the interpretation logically; more modestly but perhaps no less irritatingly, at the end one is often left with a feeling of being excluded from the mainstream research. Further, as the physics of today is inseparable from mathematics, a meaning cannot be physical and thus satisfactory if it is merely heaped over and above the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, instead of coming all the way along with the formalism as it rises in a derivation of the theory.
The second answer is that we live in a situation where objective truth has been appropriated by science, and to pass public ratification every increase in knowledge must confront experimental setups. In this world an interpretation can only then be considered satisfactory when it becomes an integral part of science. This is not unprecedented in the history of ideas: indeed, many philosophical questions with the advent of empirical science ceased to be perceived as philosophical and are now treated as scientific. Of the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, as much as possible must be moved into the area of the scientific; only then will the puzzle disappear.
2 Reconstruction of physical theory
Schema
We call reconstruction a following schema: Theorems and major results of physical theory are formally derived from simpler mathematical assumptions; these assumptions or axioms, in turn, appear as a representation in the formal language, of a set of physical principles. Thus, reconstruction consists of three parts: a set of physical principles, their mathematical representation, and a derivation of the formalism of the theory.
Contrary to an interpretation, reconstruction of physical theory acquires supplementary persuasive power which arises from the use of mathematical derivation. Established as a valid mathematical result, the theorems and equations of the theory become unquestionable and free of suspicion. 'Why is it so?'-'Because we derived it.' The question of meaning, previously asked with regard to the formalism, is removed and now bears only on the selection of the principles. No room for mystery remains in what concerns the meaning of the theory's mathematical apparatus.
Selection of first principles
That who wishes to attempt a reconstruction of physical theory must formulate the foundational principles which he or she believes plausible and translate them into mathematical axioms. Then the rest of the theory will be constructed "mechanically," by means of a formal derivation. The choice of axioms must be the only allowed freedom in the whole construction. It is commonplace to say that it is not easy to exhibit an axiomatic system that would stand to such requirements, especially in the case of quantum theory. Second, what shall one require from the first principles? As we stated above, they must be simple physical statements whose meaning is immediately, easily accessible to a scientist's understanding. They must also be such as to permit a clear and unambiguous translation of themselves into mathematically formulated axioms. A derivation of quantum theory will then rely on these axioms.
Status of first principles
Reconstruction program includes a derivation of quantum theory, but in the previous section one was told to apply and use it in order to motivate the derivation.
Is there a logical vicious circle here? We submit that there is none, and this thanks to the status of first principles. Namely, they should not necessarily be viewed as ultimate truths about nature. Independently of one's ontological commitments, the first principles only have a minimal epistemic status of being postulated for the purpose of reconstructing the theory in question. Like in the 19th-century mathematics, in theoretical physics the axiomatic method is to be separated from the attitude which yet the Greeks had toward axioms: that they represent the truth about reality. Much of the progress of mathematics is due to understanding that an axiom can no longer be considered ultimate truth, but merely a basic structural element, i.e. assumption that lies in the foundation of a certain theoretical structure. In mathematics, after departing from the Greek concept of axiom, "not only geometry, but many other, even very abstract, theories have been axiomatized, and the axiomatic method has become a powerful tool for mathematical research, as well as a means of organizing the immense field of mathematical knowledge which thereby can be made more surveyable" [17] . A similar attitude is to be taken with respect to axioms used for a formal derivation of physical theory. A short prescription would sound something like this, "If the theory does not tell you that the states of the system are ontic states, do not take them to be ontic."
To explain the above prescription, return first to the idea that, in developing an intuition with respect to the plausibility of the foundational principles used to derive a theory, one takes this theory for a given and applies it practically so as to acquire a know-how that would justify the choice of principles. Now, when one is working with several physical theories, ideas that have previously been Lorentz transformations, therefore closing the attempts to append philosophy and give a meaning a posteriori, to an already working formalism. Einstein's idea was to assume that there is no absolute, but only a relative, notion of simultaneity and that the velocity of light is constant. Once a derivation starting from these principles has been taken through, the physical meaning of Lorentz transformations stood clear and special relativity has not raised any controversy ever since.
Einstein's reconstruction of special relativity is an example of theory where the first principles are understood as truths about reality. That the speed of light is constant and that there is no absolute notion of simultaneity is now routinely taken to be objectively true and well-established facts about nature.
Thus, we have here a case in which, although in general it is not a necessity, the first principles do acquire a particular ontological status.
Moving away from special relativity, we submit that reconstruction is the exclusive way to make things clear about quantum mechanics. As such, this idea is not novel but has been in the air for some time, and a concise statement can for example be found in Rovelli [34] , Quantum mechanics will cease to look puzzling only when we will be able to derive the formalism of the theory from a set of simple physical assertions ("postulates," "principles") about the world.
Therefore, we should not try to append a reasonable interpretation to the quantum mechanical formalism, but rather to derive the formalism from a set of experimentally motivated postulates.
What is interesting is that in the last decade reconstruction became a ma- analytical apparatus, and the arithmetic quantities occurring in it, receives on the basis of the physical postulates a physical interpretation. Here, the aim is to formulate the physical requirements so completely that the analytical apparatus is just uniquely determined. Thus the route is of axiomatization" [18] . It is on this route of axiomatization that von Neumann in collaboration with Birkhoff was led to study the logic of quantum mechanics [2] . Following their work, many axiomatic systems were proposed, e.g. Zieler [40] , Varadarajan [38, 39] others; for a recent review, see [4] .
However, a vast majority of these axiomatic derivations do not fall under our notion of reconstruction, as they were based on highly abstract mathematical assumptions and not, as we required, on simple physical principles. Consider for instance the exemplary work by Mackey [25, 26] .
Mackey develops quantum mechanics as follows. Take a set B of all Borel subsets of the real line and suppose we are given two abstract sets O (a to-be space of observables) and S (a to-be space of states) and a (to-be probability)
function p which assigns a real number 0 ≤ p(x, f, M ) ≤ 1 to each triple x, f, M , where x is in O, f is in S, and M is in B. Assume certain properties of p listed in axioms M1-M9:
M1 Function p is a probability measure. Mathematically, we have p(x, f,
whenever the M n are Borel sets that are disjoint in pairs.
M2 Two states, in order to be different, must assign different probability distributions to at least one observable; and two observables, in order to be different, must have different probability distributions in at least one state.
M3 Let x be any member of O and let u be any real bounded Borel function on the real line. Then there exists
. . are members of S and
M5 Call question an observable e in O such that p(e, f, {0, 1}) = 1 for all f in S. Questions e and e ′ are disjoint if e ≤ 1 − e ′ . Then a question ∞ n=1 e n exists for any sequence (e n ) of questions such that e m and e n are disjoint whenever n = m.
M6 If E is any compact, question-valued measure then there exists an observ-
M7
The partially ordered set of all questions in quantum mechanics is isomorphic to the partially ordered set of all closed subspaces of a separable, infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.
M8 If e is any question different from 0 then there exists a state f in S such that m f (e) = 1.
M9
For each sequence (f n ) of members of S and each sequence (λ n ) of nonnegative real numbers whose sum is 1, one-parameter time evolution group V t : S → S acts as follows: Later, Mackey's axioms M5-M8 were reformulated in the language of quantum logic, thereby rephrasing the assumptions that underlie the Hilbert space structure. This was the case, most prominently, in [20, 28, 29] and also in a seminal book [1] . Quantum logical assumptions are simple enough to be accessible for direct comprehension, in contrast to Mackey's mathematically formulated axioms, but they tend to be linguistic rather than physical. This means that one typically argues that it makes no sense to speak about certain terms other than if some suitable "trivial" properties had been postulated, e.g. the notion of proposition is only meaningful if like in Ref. [7] negation or partial order, or like in Ref. [1] implication, are defined. Although we fully acknowledge that linguistic a priori arguments can be interesting and powerful, we however separate them from the reconstruction program as introduced above: in the latter, first principles from which the theory is derived should have a physical meaning, i.e. tell us something directly and intuitively apprehensible about the world and quantum theory as describing our knowledge of it. Such principles, ideally, should be independent of a particular formalism in which we derive quantum theory and therefore should not rely on the language of quantum logic as just one among many such formalisms.
Contemporary examples
Among the modern developments, an interesting example of reconstruction comes from the instrumentalist derivation of quantum theory from "five reasonable axioms" by Hardy [16] . Hardy's "reasonable axioms" set up a link between two quantities, K and N , which play a fundamental role in the reconstruction. K is the number of degrees of freedom of the system and is defined as the minimum number of probability measurements needed to determine the state. Dimension N is defined as the maximum number of states that can be reliably distinguished from one another in a single measurement. The axioms then are: H1 Probabilities. Relative frequencies (measured by taking the proportion of times a particular outcome is observed) tend to the same value for any case where a given measurement is performed on an ensemble of n systems prepared by some given preparation in the limit as n becomes infinite. H5 Continuity. There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system between any two pure states of that system.
Although four of the H1-H5 axioms use mathematical language in the formulation, their meaning in Hardy's instrumentalist setting can be grasped much easier than the meaning of Mackey's axioms M1-M9. In fact, this meaning is already suggested by the names given to the axioms by Hardy. Therefore H1-H4 can be rephrased into physical principles from which one derives the formalism of the theory and thus provide an example of reconstruction. None of these principles is trivial: for H1, assume that probability introduced instrumentally as relative frequency of measurements is a well-defined concept and obeys the laws of probability theory; for H2, assume that the number of parameters needed to characterize a state is directly linked to the number of states that can be distinguished in one measurement; for H3, that the linear structure of state space shrinks accordingly to the maximum number of states of the system distinguishable in one measurement; for H4, assume multiplicability of the quantity defined as dimension and of the quantity defined as the number of degrees of freedom. Now formulate these assumptions mathematically and use Hardy's theorems to derive from them the full-blown formalism of quantum mechanics. A particular instrumental philosophy does not play a crucial role in the derivation: Hardy himself acknowledges that his axioms can be adopted by a realist as well as a hidden variable theorist or a partisan of collapse interpretations. Thus, the choice of underlying philosophy is not critical for derivation, and Hardy's reconstruction advances our understanding of quantum theory irrespectively of the justification which one may have for the axioms. What matters are the sim-ple physical principles formulated as axioms H1-H4. We shall see an opposite example in the next section, in which the justification used for fundamental principles will limit the area in which operates the mathematical derivation.
Still, it is not so clear whether axiom H5 has a physical meaning. Because it is this axiom that makes the theory quantum rather than classical, the reconstruction program cannot be said to be fully implemented and taken to its logical conclusion. To further illustrate this point, we distinguish two types of continuity assumptions that are made in axiomatic derivations of quantum theory. Continuity assumptions of type 1 select the correct type of numeric field which is used in the construction of the Hilbert space of the theory; namely, of the field C of complex numbers. Solèr's theorem [37] or Zieler's axioms [40] are examples of type 1 continuity assumptions. Hardy's case is different and is an example of the continuity assumptions of type 2, which are made in order to bring in the superposition principle. Other such assumptions include We see that various axiomatic systems of quantum theory contain, under one form or another, the assumption of continuity and it is this assumption which is largely responsible for making things quantum. Whatever the framework of the reconstruction is, bringing in topological considerations is essential. As it is exceedingly difficult to formulate a physical principle which may give a meaning to the continuity assumption of type 2, all reconstruction programs suffer here from the intrusion of an element of mathematical abstraction.
The above critique concerning the continuity axiom applies to another examples of reconstruction initially proposed by Rovelli [34] and that we developed elsewhere [11, 12] . Here, the reconstruction starts from two informationtheoretic axioms:
R1 There exists a maximum amount of relevant information that can be extracted from a system.
R2
It is always possible to obtain new information about the system.
From these axioms and with the help of supplementary mathematical assumptions one derives the formalism of quantum mechanics. While the supplementary assumptions cast a shadow on the conceptual clarity of the reconstruction much in the same fashion as does H5, the whole program presents itself differently from Hardy's instrumentalism. The mathematical derivation being still devoid of ontological commitments, justification of the first principles which we propose cannot refer to an ontology, except for an arguably problematic case in which one would be prepared to take information for a fundamental building block of reality. Rather, by reconstructing quantum theory from information-theoretic principles we point at its epistemological character and at its role as a theory of (a certain kind of) knowledge; i.e. with certain limits being imposed on the kind of information one may be dealing with, the most general theory of this information takes the form of quantum theory. Here again reconstruction appears more appealing than a mere interpretation as it leaves room for any justification of the first principles different from ours. Indeed, one may wish to adopt an ontological picture to justify R1-R2 or take no position at all with respect to ontology. At the same time, regardless of a specific philosophical justification of first principles, the meaning of quantum theory stands clear: quantum theory is a general theory of information constrained by certain information-theoretic principles.
CBH reconstruction
Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (CBH) offer an example of a set of quantum informational postulates from which one derives the structure of quantum theory [6] .
CBH postulate three fundamental principles:
CBH1 No superluminal information transfer via measurement.
CBH2 No broadcasting.
CBH3 No bit commitment.
To give a mathematical formulation of these principles, CBH use the C * -algebraic formalism. Consider a composite system, A + B, consisting of two component subsystems, A and B, understood as C * -algebras. 
An operation here is understood as a completely positive linear map on an algebra, and T * ρ is a state over the algebra defined for every state ρ on the same algebra as
at the condition that ρ(T (I)) = 0. Nonselective measurements T are the ones that have T (I) = I, and then ρ(T (I)) = ρ(I) = ||ρ|| = 1. CBH explain that, in their view, Definition 3.1 entails
CBH then assert that if the condition (3) holds for all self-adjoint B ∈ B
and for all T of the form
where A ∈ A ∨ B with A and B being C * -independent, and E is a positive operator in A, then algebras A and B are kinematically independent, i.e. all
A ∈ A and B ∈ B commute [6, Theorem 1]. Thus kinematic independence is derived from the assumption of C * -independence and from the condition (1),
where C * -independence is brought into the discussion to grasp the meaning of the fact that systems A and B are distinct. Mathematically, C * -independence means that for any state ρ 1 over A and for any state ρ 2 over B there is a state ρ over A ∨ B such that ρ| A = ρ 1 and ρ| B = ρ 2 . As for Definition 3.1, the authors take it to be a mathematical representation of Axiom CBH1.
According to the authors, the meaning of CBH1 is that when Alice and Bob perform local measurements, Alice's measurements can have no influence on the statistics for the outcomes of Bob's measurements, and vice versa. CBH also say that "otherwise this would mean instantaneous information transfer between Alice and Bob" and "the mere performance of a local measurement (in the nonselective sense) cannot, in and of itself, transfer information to a physically distinct system." Upon reading these statements, one has a feeling that for CBH distinct and distant are synonyms. This identification of terms might indeed be a tacit assumption among quantum information theorists who do not have to worry about relativistic effects, but in the full-blown C * -algebraic framework, as well as in the general philosophical context, meaning of the two words is certainly different. We have here an example showing how the initial quantum informational language of the fundamental principles CBH1-CBH3 constrains the use of the algebraic formalism to situations where fundamental principles make sense from the point of view of quantum information, while in fact the formalism could also be used in other, more complex situations. Unlike Hardy's derivation which was independent of the particular instrumental justification of its fundamental principles, the CBH reconstruction cannot be taken through outside the field of quantum information, because its mathematics, while being still valid outside this field, will require additional justification. Apart from the identification of terms 'distant' and 'distinct,' such is also the case with time evolution, which is tacitly taken by CBH to be the usual quantum mechanical time evolution, while in the general C * -algebraic framework this is not at all the case and a variety of different "temporal" evolutions are possible. One then avoids this problem at the price of confining oneself to the quantum informational paradigm.
Equating Definition 3.1 with Axiom CBH1 requires particular attention to the mathematical details, and a point has to be made about CBH's proof. If, following the authors, in this definition ρ is to be taken as a state over B, then the definition does not make sense: operation T is defined on A ∨ B and consequently, in accordance with (2), T * ρ is defined for the states ρ over A ∨ B.
If one follows the CBH definition with a state ρ over B, then there would be no need to write ρ| B as CBH do, for a simple reason that ρ| B = ρ. To suggest a remedy, we extend the reasoning behind this definition and reformulate it in three alternative ways.
• The first one is to require that in Definition 3.1 the state ρ be a state over the algebra A ∨ B.
• The second alternative is to consider states ρ on B but to require a different formula, namely that (T | B ) * ρ = ρ as states over B.
• Finally, the third alternative proceeds as follows: Take arbitrary states T must not take operators out of B. The problem here is the same as the one we encountered in the discussion of the previous alternative, and it is only by assuming the closure condition that one is able to obtain that T (B) = B.
In the third alternative, for the state ρ over A∨B, write from the definition of
and this is equal to ρ 2 (B). Consequently, ρ(T (B)) = ρ 2 (B) = ρ(B). Can we now say that this holds for all states ρ over A ∨ B ? The answer is obviously yes, and this is because each state over A ∨ B can be seen as an extension of its own restriction to B. Therefore, one has to modify Definition 3.1 for it to be formally correct, and this entails a modification in the proof of Equation 3.
We now turn to the remaning two CBH axioms. Axiom CBH2 is used to establish that algebras A and B, taken separately, are non-Abelian. Broadcasting, which enters in the formulation of the axiom, is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3. Given two isomorphic, kinematically independent C * -algebras
A and B, a pair {ρ 1 , ρ 2 } of states over A can be broadcast in case there is a standard state σ over B and a dynamical evolution represented by an operation
Equivalence between the 'no broadcasting' condition and non-Abelianness of the C * -algebra is then derived from the following theorem:
Theorem 3.4. Let A and B be two kinematically independent C * -algebras.
Then: It is interesting to note that non-Abelianness of the algebras A and B, taken one by one, is proved by assuming that they are kinematically independent.
This means that quantumness, of which non-Abelianness is a necessary ingredient, is not a property of any given system taken separately, as if it were the only physical system in the Universe; on the contrary, to be able to derive the quantum character of the theory, one must consider the system in the context of at least one other system that is physically distinct from the first one. As a consequence, for example, this forbids treating the whole Universe as a quantum system if one reconstructs quantum theory along the CBH lines. From this theorem the authors deduce that the impossibility of unconditionally secure bit commitment entails that "if each of the pair of separated physical systems A and B has a non-uniquely decomposable mixed state, so that A ∨ B has a pair {ρ 0 , ρ 1 } of distinct classically correlated states whose marginals relative to A and B are identical, then A and B must be able to occupy an entangled state that can be transformed to ρ 0 or ρ 1 at will by a local operation." The term 'separated' is essential and, nevertheless, its precise meaning is not defined. It can be, indeed, compared to the use of terms 'distinct' and 'distant' in the analysis of Axiom CBH1. When the authors claim that Alice and Bob represent "spacelike separated systems," while formally Alice and Bob are just two C * -algebras, one sees how the way in which CBH apply the algebraic formalism is severely constrained by the context of quantum information theory.
Here appears again a situation in which language and context used to formulate and justify the fundamental principles set up a limit on the applicability of the mathematical formalism in which these principles are then represented. Even if the formalism can be understood more generally than within the discipline chosen in order to comprehend the language, one still cannot make his way out of this disciplinary prison or else the sense of the axioms will be lost. If one however persists and crosses the border and then, say, obtains a new mathematical result, this result will be void of physical meaning until a new, broader justification of the fundamental principles is given. Philosophical and linguistic justification, and mathematical derivation play here a game of mutual onslaught and retreat which, ultimately, leads to the advance of science.
The CBH result would be a perfect example of reconstruction were it not for a great deal of mathematical structure which is tacitly assumed in the choice of 
Conclusion
Reconstruction brings in clarity to where interpretation was struggling to make sense of a physical theory. What belongs to physical theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. All other questions belong to metatheory and are related to the metatheoretic justification task for the choice of first principles.
The notion of reconstruction presented here resembles Einstein's notion of 'principle theory'. Principle theories, according to Einstein, "employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and starting point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy" [8] . Reconstruction of quantum theory remains an only partially solved problem.
Notwithstanding, it is already competing with traditional interpretations due to its appealing conceptual transparency and to the clarity that it brings into the structure of the theory. It would be too ambitious to expect that all of modern quantum theory, including field theory and quantum gravity, could be derived from a few axioms; mathematical abstractions and further assumptions are still a necessity. However, if we want to understand the meaning of even most advanced parts of quantum theory, it is inevitable that simple physical principles be formulated and put in the very foundation of quantum theory.
